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ST. THOMAS, METAPHYSICS, 
AND FORMAL CAUSALITY 
1. THE PROBLEM OF THE CAUSES 
Lawrence DEWAN 
AS we have e1sewhere had occasion to remark, St. Thomas Aquinas' Commentary 
fi on the Metaphysics of Aristotle can, if carefully controlled, provide precious 
indications of how a Thomistic metaphysics ought to be constructed. 1 In the present 
paper l wish to expose and to sorne degree explore one such indication. Aristotle, in 
Metaphysics 3, presents problems which the metaphysical inquirer ought to have in 
mind, so that in his thinking he will aim at a definite goal and thus will be able to see 
when the task has been truly accomplished. 2 The first problem presented is whether 
the consideration of the four types of cause pertains to one science or to many and 
diverse sciences. This question presupposes what had been said in the introductory 
books, namely that the sought-after science of wisdom would be knowledge of the 
first and highest causes. St. Thomas also relates it to the last words of Book 2, which 
raise the same issue. And this, says St. Thomas, is to ask whether it be10ngs to one 
science, and especially to this one, to demonstrate by means of ail the causes, or 
rather is it the case that diverse sciences demonstrate from diverse types of cause. 
St. Thomas sees this problem raised in first place because it deals with the very 
method 3 of the science itse1f. Aristotle had said in Book 2 that before undertaking to 
learn a science, one ought to be clear about its method.4 
After giving a list of the problems, Aristotle undertakes to spell them out as 
problems one by one. Our question, on the method of the science, is discussed by 
St. Thomas in lectio 4. St. Thomas, in ail his discussions of the problems of Book 3, 
L Cf. my article, "Being per se. Being per accidens and St. Thomas' Metaphysics". Science et Esprit 30 
(1978) 169-184. 
Henceforth we will refer to St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of ArislOtle as "CM". citing 
book, lectio, and the paragraph number from the Cathala-Spiazzi edition. Rome/Turin, 1950: 
Marietti. 
2. Cf. CM 3.1 (340-341) and AR1STOTLE, Metaph. 3.1 (995a34-b2). 
3. The Latin word is "modus". 1 use "method" somewhat reluctantly to translate this word. Method, 
as involving the notion of pathway, wou Id be more the "ordo" of the science. Modus is a more 
qualitative conception. 
4. CM 3.2 (346). 
285 
LA WRENCE DEWAN 
concludes each one with a brief staternent of the solution eventually taught by 
Aristotle later in the Metaphysics. Needless to say, these brief presentations of the 
Aristotelian conclusions make most interesting reading. However, the presentation 
as regards the first problem is of special interest because St. Thomas teUs us that 
Aristotle never expressly answers iL He says one can gather the answer from what 
Aristotle says in various places, and he proceeds to explain what he has gathered to 
be the answer: 
"For he deterrnines in Book 4 that this science considers ens inasrnuch as it is 
ens: and so it belongs to it to con si der the primary substances, and not to natural 
science, because above mobile substance there are other substances. But every 
substance either is ens through itself, if it is form alone, or e1se, if it is composed 
out of matter and form, it is ens through its own form; hence, inasrnuch as this 
science undertakes to consider ens, it considers most of ail the formaI cause. But 
the primary substances are not known by us in such a way that we know about 
them what they are, as can in a way be had from those things which are 
determined in Book 9 : and thus in the knowledge of them the formai cause has 
no place. But though they are immobile according to themselves, nevertheless 
they are the cause of motion of other things after the manner of an end; and 
therefore, to this science, inasmuch as it undertakes to consider the primary 
substances, it especially pertains to consider the final cause, and also in a way the 
moving cause. But [it pertains to it to consider] the mate rial cause, according to 
itself, in no way, because matter is not universally 5 a cause of ens, but rather of 
sorne determinate kind, i.e. mobile substance. But such causes pertain to the 
consideration of the particular sciences, except perhaps that they are considered 
by this science inasmuch as they are contained under ens. For in that way its 
consideration extends to ail things. 6 
This then is the basic statement from which we take our start. In order to bring 
out its decisive features, we will note our disagreernent with the discussion of it found 
in James C. Doig's book, Aquinas on Metaphysics. 7 Doig discusses it principally in his 
comparison of the doctrine of St. Thomas in CM 4.1, on metaphysics as the study of 
ens inasmuch as it is ens, with what Avicenna, Averroes and St. Albert had taughL 8 
Since both Averroes and Albert had looked on the doctrine of Aristotle at this point 
as a reply to the first problem posed in Book 3, Doig is led to speak of iL But since, in 
CM 4.1, St. Thomas makes no reference whatsoever to this issue, Doig is obliged to 
look back to where St. Thomas treats it, viz in Book 3. 
Doig presents A verroes as saying that metaphysics treats of the formaI and final 
causes only (p. 127). He then presents Albert as saying the sa me thing (p. 128), on the 
5. The text reads "convenienter" , i.e. suitably. 1 am conjecturing the reading: "communiter", i.e. 
universally. 
Concerning this doctrine about the limited, particular nature of maUer's causality, cf. ST. THOMAS, 
De substantiis separalis, c. 7 (Leonine ed., lines 91-102). 
6. CM 3.4 (384). For "ens" (that which is), we retain the Latin. 
7. James C. DOIG, Aquinas on Metaphysics, The Hague, 1972: Martinus Nijhoff. We will make 
references to this work in the body of our text, by page. 
8. It is to be noted that in his ex professo review of CM 4.1, Doig (pp. 102-110) omits all mention 
of St. Thomas' paragraphs 540-543, on the reduction of aIl the things Aristotle has mentioned to 
four modes of being [modi essendi]. One would have thought this wou Id have sorne importance. 
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basis of Albert's Metaphysica 4, tL l, However, he notes that Albert also attribut es ta 
metaphysics the study of the efficient and material causes as weil; this is inasmuch as 
metaphysics studies ail beings (among which are efficient and material causes) 
(p. 129, using texts from Albert, Metaph. 3, tL 2). 
Doig goes on to contrast St. Thomas with these positions. He says that, in his 
presentation of CM 4.1, he has already mentioned that Thomas earlier in CM 
"explained that metaphysics studies ail four causes" (p. 129). Now he turns to CM 
3.4, St. Thomas' ex professa treatment of Aristotle's first problem. Doig stresses the 
importance of the question at issue: 
"Obviously, the answer given to the difficulty will completely determine the 
science of metaphysics: the object, the method. the relationship to the other 
sciences - ail is affected." (p. 130) 
He points out that Aristotle has given no answer in Book 3, but he never alludes to 
the fact that, for St. Thomas, Aristotle never explicitly answers the question. 
St. Thomas says he has been able to gather a solution from doctrines in various parts 
of the Metaphysics. 9 Doig speaks about how elaborate St. Thomas' treatment is, but 
when he cornes to tell us what the doctrine is, he says: 
"As Albert, so Thomas too says that ail four causes are studied. As bath 
A verroes and Albert, Thomas says that to study being as su ch means above ail 
to study the formai cause; yet unlike his predecessors, Thomas does not ho Id 
that one studies especially form because the form is the principle of our 
knowledge; rather one studies form because beings have their perfection from 
the formai cause ... And finally, Thomas parts company with A verroes, but joins 
Albert, in nothing [read: noting] 10 that metaphysics studies the material cause 
due to the fact that sorne beings are material." (p. 131) 
As he goes on, Doig examines the merits of Albert's and Thomas' diverse reasons for 
metaphysics' study of the formai cause. He says that Thomas' reason goes deeper 
th an Albert's (which is supposed to be that the knowledge of the formai cause gives 
us the greatest knowledge of a thing), implicitly explaining Albert's reason. Thus, 
Doig continues: 
" ... because the form of a thing is the source of what the thing is. Thus Thomas 
says, we study the formai cause of being as such. As Thomas indicates, 
Book r (IV) explains that it is the metaphysician who studies being as such, and 
not the naturai philosopher, since sorne beings are not natural, that is not 
material. Now it would follow from this - and this is Thomas' point - that ta 
study what ail beings have in common is to study the formai cause ... only by 
studying what is corn mon to ail substances (name1y form) can one study being as 
such." (pp. 132-133) Il 
Ci. CM 3.4 (384). Doig (p. 132, n. 3) does quote the Latin text as part of a larger whole. 
10. Doig's book abounds in scribal errars. 
1 L Doig postpones (at p. 134) his remarks on the efficient and material causes, and the reasons givcn 
by St. Albert and St. Thomas concerning them, until his ch. V. Concerning the efficient cause, 
cf. pp. 202-210. At p. 202 Doig asks: "As a philosopher did Albert prove God was cause of 
being 1" He do es not refer ta, and seems entirely unaware of, Albert, Metaph}sica. bk. 5, tr. t. c. 3 
(ed. Cologne 16/1, p. 213, lines 60-75), where there is a praof of the tirst efficient (and creative) 
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In his resumé (pp. 139-140) Doig unites the materials from CM 3.4 and 4.1. He 
says: 
"Metaphysics studies ail four causes: the formai cause because the form is the 
source of a thing's perfection; the final cause, because first substances are to be 
studied and they are the final causes of other beings; the efficient cause, again 
because one studies first substances; the material cause, because sorne beings are 
ma terial. " 
The first thing to be noted (we intend to speak only of St. Thomas and 
St. Albert, not of Averroes) is that in treating of this first Aristotelian problem, Doig 
has failed to use the third tractate of Albert's Metaphysica 3. In tr. 2, used by Doig, 
Albert presents a first discussion of the problems. Tr. 3 is a second, more ample 
treatment of the same problems, and is written entirely in the "digressive" mode, i.e. 
dispenses with the paraphrase format in favour of a more comprehensive discussion. 12 
In tr. 3, the first chapter is on the first problem. In the course of presenting the 
difficulty, Albert introduces the opinion of Avicenna that cause and caused are a 
division proper to ens, and so belong properly to the first philosopher: and so 
Avicenna says that the knowledge concerning ail the causes belongs only to the first 
philosopher. 13 
Albert further wonders why Aristotle, in Book l, first inquired into the number 
and sorts of cause, and then, in Book 2, showed that they were finite, and now here 
asks whether ail this is really his task or not. The implication is that the question must 
have something else in mind than the study of causes as beings. 
Albert accordingly judges "without prejudice to a better opinion" that the 
knowledge of causes can be inquired into by one same science in three ways: (1) as 
something sought and eventually concluded to (we may suppose, as in Book 1), and 
(2) as part of the subject, or the subject, concerning which something is concluded 
(we may suppose, as in Book 2, where it was shown that the causes are finite), and (3) 
as a means or principle, through which one concludes that which one concludes 
concerning the subject or part ofit. Now, says Albert, in this present question, we are 
not asking about the causes in the first or second way, though Avicenna's argument 
seems to suggest that we are. Here, the issue is solely about the third way. Albert says 
that this was the way he treated it earlier, in tr. 2, in accordance with Aristotle's own 
intention. 14 
cause of being, prior to ail moving causality (the whole of 213.33-214.56 should be noted). 
Doig (p. 202), in beginning his own reply to his question, says of Albert: "If he did, he has certainly 
left no trace of his proof in his exposition of Book A ". This does not seem correct. At bk, Il, 
tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, 16/2, 482.39-71), on Aristotle at 1071b4-6, Albert takes the single 
sentence of Aristotle as a complete argument and spells it out, just in itself. This is not an argument 
from motion, but from substance, generation and corruption. And it seems to prove a cause of 
being. Cf. also our forthcoming paper, "The Distinctiveness of St. Thomas' Third Way", to he 
published in Dialogue. 
12. Cf. ALBERT, Metaphy.sica, bk. 3, tr. 3, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, 16/1, 138.7-16), 
13. That the study of causality as such is proper to the metaphysician is taught by St. Thomas, 
ln Phys. 2.5 (ed. Maggiolo, RomelTurin, 1954: Marietti, #177). 
14. Cf. ALBERT, Metaphysica, bk. 3, tr. 3, ç. 1: in ed. cit., concerning Avicenna, cf. 138.66-72; on 
Aristotle's order of procedure, cf. 139.1-9; on the three ways, cf. 139.10-23. 
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In his ultimate resolution of the problem, Albert says that since the mat he-
matician considers things conceived with matter according to being [esse] and 
separate from matter according to notion [ratio], and the efficient and final causes 
are causes of esse rather than of ratio, neither the efficient nor the fïnal cause is used 
in mathematics. But in metaphysics [in divinis] there is consideration especially of 
esse, and the principles of esse are prior to esse mobile, and ail the kinds of cause are 
principles of esse. Thus, the metaphysician demonstrates through al! the kinds of 
cause. Though the cause "whence motion" and the matter and the end seem to be 
principles of the mobile as mobile, nevertheless there is an immobile cause "whence 
motion"; and there is a matter not determined through the subject of change and 
motion, but rather through this, that it itself is constituting the foundation of that 
which is [fundans ens), and individuating and standing under entity [individuans et 
substans entitat/]: and these roles are prior to the subject of motion, since only that 
which is founded [fundatum) and an individual and something standing under is 
subject to change and motion, but the converse is not true, i.e. that every founded 
and individuated thing, every intrinsically substantive thing [substans in seipso], is 
subject to change and motion. And Albert continues by presenting the properly 
metaphysical conception of the final cause. 15 
Thus, Albert has made the genuine meaning of the question: what kinds of cause 
does the metaphysician use in order to demonstrate his conclusions. And to the 
question as so understood, he gives as the proper answer: ail four causes. And he has 
provided this answer by presenting properly metaphysical modes of ail four causes. 
Whereas in the earlier presentation, in tr. 2, he brought in the material cause through 
using what he has in tf. 3 described as the first two ways of understanding the 
question,16 here in tr. 3 he brings matter in in the way that the question is 
really meant. 17 
We are now in a position to appreciate St. Thomas' treatment of the problem. 
The first thing to determine is how he understands the problem. And he is quite 
explicit from the start: 
"Therefore he [Aristotle) says that the first query is ... whether the consideration 
of the four causes, according to the four kinds, pertains to one science, or to 
15. Ibid., 139.65-96. 
16. Cf. Ibid., bk. 3, tr. 2, c. 1 (cd. Cologne \6/1, 113.58-65). Albert uses the language of Avicenna here. 
17. Cf. nevertheless Albert at bk. 3, tr. 3, c. 2. The problem is, in part, if both the physicist and the 
metaphysician demonstrale with ail the causes, will not both have equal right to the title: "wise 
man"? The answer is that the metaphysician is the wise man. He primarily demonstrates with the 
ultimate end and the [irst formai substance and quiddity. And we read: "And though tirst 
philosophy demonstrates through the cause which is moving principle, nevertheless it then collsiders 
the lirst unmoved mover, which, through its OWll form which it has substantially within itself, acting 
towards form, makes substance known: as one knows the hou se from the form of the housebuilder as 
housebuilder, and the healthy [man] from the form of the healing doctor, as healer. - And if it 
uses matter in demonstrating, again it invokes it as related through proportion to form, which is 
in it [matter] confusedly, because otherwise it wouId not he a principIe of knowing ~omething. And 
thus it is clear how the tirst philosopher relates use of the mover and matter 10 the form and 
the end ... " (ed. Cologne, 16/1, 141.47-59). 
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many and diverse. And this is to ask whether it be10ngs to one science, and 
especially to this one, to demonstrate from ail the causes, or rather do diverse 
sciences demonstrate from diverse causes." 1& 
Again, at the beginning of the lectio in which he discusses the argumentative 
treatment of the problem, he says: 
"First he [Aristotle] argues concerning the consideration of this science, as to the 
causes through which it is demonstrated." 19 
Accordingly, St. Thomas' presentation of what he has gathered together and 
constructed as .. Aristotle's answer" is to be read in the light of his quite definite 
understanding of the question. Thus, we cannot accept Doig's judgment that "as 
Albert, so Thomas says that ail four causes are studied" (p. 131). What we read in 
St. Thomas is: 
"Causam autem materialem secundum seipsam nu/lo modo ... "20 
The science of metaphysics considers the material cause, as such, in no way. The 
reason is that matter is not universally 21 a cause of ens, but is a cause of sorne 
determinate genus, namely mobile substance. Such causes pertain to particular 
sciences, not to metaphysics. 
Following this, in the text of St. Thomas, cornes the "nisi forte" remark. Of 
course, one can say that such causes, i.e. particular causes, are considered by this 
science inasmuch as they are contained under ens: in that way, metaphysics talks 
about aIl things. 
This last remark is c1early outside the proper mode of the question - i.e. by 
what causes does the metaphysician demonstrate? We have dropped into the 
Avicennian (or an even more remote) treatment of the question. 
What emerges here is quite a definite opposition between St. Thomas and 
St. Albert. Both are very c1ear on the sense of the question. St. Albert provides a 
notion of a strictly metaphysical material cause. St. Thomas quite definitely refuses 
to accept it. Albert proposes a matter prior to the subject of change, a cause of esse. 
St. Thomas will have none of it. 
Now what about Doig's treatment of St. Thomas and St. Albert on the formaI 
cause? First, we might note that St. Albert does not limit himself to saying that the 
formai cause is primary because it is the principle of knowledge. He says that the 
reason for it being principle of knowledge is that it is the princip le of substance as 
substance, and of "ens in eo quod ens",22 Albert says he himself has often said this, 
and one of the places to which we are referred by the editor shows us Albert, in the 
very act of paraphrasing Aristotle, inc1uding the reason why form gives more 
knowledge, viz: 
18. CM 3.2 (346). 
19. CM 3.4 (369). 
20. CM 3.4 (384). 
21. Cf. above, n. 5. 
22. ALBERT, Metaphysica, bk. 3, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Cologne 16/1, 113.54-56). 
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"For though someone may know the same thing in many ways, we say indeed 
that he more fully knows who through demonstration says that thing in its own 
formai esse, what the thing itself is according to substance, which is the 'what' 
and the' on account of what', than he who does not know su ch substantial esse 
of the thing," 23 
Doig at least once uses the following formula to express what he sees as the deeper 
reason stated by St. Thomas for the study of form in metaphysics: " ... because the 
form is the source of what the thing is." (p. 132) Now, this is very close to Albert as 
quoted above. 
Indeed, what one might wonder about in Doig's presentation is the way he treats 
St. Thomas. He constantly paraphrases St. Thomas on the reason for the study of 
form in metaphysics; thus, "one studies form because beings have their perfection 
from the formai cause" (p. 131); "because the form is the source of what a thing is. 
Thus Thomas says, we study the formai cause of being as such" (132); 24 "because the 
form is the source of a thing's perfection" (p. 140, also p. 335). 
Let us look at what St. Thomas says. He begins his gathering of Aristotle's 
position by a reference to Book 4: 
"F or he determines in Book 4 that this science considers ens inasmuch as it is 
ens: and so it belongs to it to consider the primary substances, and not to natural 
science, since above mobile substance there are other substances." 25 
Here, then, we have metaphysics and "two things" to consider, so to speak, viz ens 
and primary substances. 
Next, St. Thomas settles the question of the cause used to demonstrate, as 
regards the consideration of ens: 
"But every substance either is ens through itself, if it is form alone, or else, if it is 
composed out of matter and form, it is ens through its form ; hence, inasmuch as 
this science undertakes to consider ens, it considers most of ail the formai 
cause." 26 
St. Thomas gives no reference here, probably because it is too clear that this is the 
doctrine of Books 7 and 8. 27 
The argument of St. Thomas is clear also. The cause (hence the repeated use of 
"through" [per]) of ens is form : i.e. if a thing itself isform, then it is ens through itself, 
23. Ibid. (113.27-31). 
24. What St. Thomas says is that every substance is ens through form, i.e. form is the cause of ens. 
cali it "paraphrasing" ta say "form is cause of what a thing is". Doig does immediately add: 
"we study the formai cause of being as such", and if he takes Ihis as the primary slatement of 
St. Thomas, he is right. But his "thus" makes it look as though form is cause of ens because form is 
cause of what a thing is. This is not true. Rather, form is cause of what a thing is because form is 
cause of ens. 
25. CM 3.4 (384). 
26. Ihid. 
27. Cf. especially ARISTOTLE, Metaph. 7.17 (104Ib25-28) and 8.2 (1043al-12), as regards the causality of 
form in composite substances; and 8.6 (1045a36-b7) (cf. CM 8.5: 1762-1764), as regards the role 
of form in substances which are form alone. 
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and if a thing is a composite of matter and form, then it is ens through form. Thus, a 
survey of the modes of ens (simple and composite) reveals the universal causality of 
form vis-à-vis ens. 28 
Doig's account of this passage (quoted above, p. 287, end n. II) 1 find 
inadequate. St. Thomas is not speaking about the mere community of form ( .... what 
is common ta ail substances ... ") but about the community of form's causal raie 
vis-à-vis ens inasmuch as it is ens. 
Thus, two features of Doig's presentation here seem objectionable: (a) he loses 
sight of the importance of the notion of cause in his account of St. Thomas' solution, 
and (b) he substitutes sorne other item for St. Thomas' "ens". St. Thomas does not 
say in the solution that form is cause or source of a thing's perfection, or of what the 
thing is. He says that the form is the cause of ens. 
It is our intention in the rest of this paper to follow out to sorne extent this 
doctrine of metaphysics as using the formai cause especially, insofar as metaphysics is 
considerativa entis: as this can be seen in CM 7 and 8. But before leaving the solution 
to the first problem, let us note the brief remarks made about the final and moving 
causes St. Thomas (see the text as quoted above, p. 286), having dealt with 
metaphysics as considerativa entis, th en directs his, attention ta the other target of 
metaphysical investigation established in Book 4, namely the primary substances: 
and the point is that we cannot know them in such a way as to know what they are. 
He says that this is had in a way [aliqualiter] from Book 9.29 Going on to say, then, 
that accordingly formai causality has no place in metaphysics as it undertakes to 
consider the primary substances [considerativa primarum substantiarum], St. Thomas 
puts the main insistence on the final cause of motion, just as one finds in Aristotle's 
Book 12, though once again St. Thomas does not bother to give a reference. 3o The 
addition concerning the moving cause "in a way" [aliqualiter causam moventem] could 
hardly be more cryptic. 31 
It is clear enough from what we have seen that St. Thomas' position is that 
metaphysics makes no use of the material cause for demonstration, and that as 
considerativa entis metaphysics is primarily knowledge throughformal causality. This 
at any rate Îs St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle. One would expect, then, that 
28. If this picture contains any difficulty (and 1 do not consider it a major difficulty), it is in the notion 
of the "through itself', which gives a cause-effect or dual schema to what is one. Cf. ST. THOMAS, 
Summa the%giae 1.39.2.ad 5: the formaI cause as such does not imply diversity of cause and effect. 
29. One wou Id think St. Thomas must mean ca. 9.10 (105Ibl7-1052all), but in his comments on This, 
at CM 9.11 (1904-1919), one wou1d gather more that we do know the quod quid est of simple 
substances. Cf. 1905: "Quicumque enim non attingit ad quod quid est rei simp1icis, penitus 
ignorat ipsam ... " (and cf. 1915); 1916: ..... patet quod secundum sententiam Aristotelis humanus 
intellectus potest pertingere ad intelligendum substantias simplices ... " (cf. a1so 1912: "sed oportet ut 
intelligantur si mente attingantur. .. "). 
30. Cf. ARISTOTl.E, Metaph. 12.7 (1072a26-30); and CM 12.7 (2519-2522 and 2528). 
31. St. Thomas is here probably hinting at creative causality. The sliding l'rom the moving cause to 
the divine mode of agency is a subtle pro cess : cf. e.g. CM 7.17 (1660-1661). 
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this view of Aristotle's metaphysics would be readily apparent in St. Thomas' reading 
of Metaphysics 7 and 8, in which ens is considered as divided by the categories. 12 Our 
aim, then, in what follows is to consider CM 7 and 8 from this point of view. 
II. THE PROCEDURE IN BOOKS 7 AND 8 
Questions of order are very important for St. Thomas. 3J Here in CM, if we ask 
for the order of Books 7 and 8, we find quite a definite approach different from that 
of, e.g., Albert the Great.34 The point of doctrine which St. Thomas exploits to the 
maximum in presenting Books 7 and 8 is the distinction between the merely logical 
mode of consideration, and the mode of consideration which penetra tes to the proper 
principles of things: let us cali the latter the "philosophical" or even the "existential" 
consideration. 35 Thus, if we look at the introduction to Book 8, we read: 
"After the Philosopher has determined in Book 7 concerning substance, in the 
logical mode, i.e. considering the definition, and the parts of the definition, and 
other such things which are considered according to reason [secundum rationem: 
following reason, or in the domain of reason], in this Book 8 he intends to 
de termine concerning sensible substances through proper principles [per propria 
principia: through the things' own principles], applying what were inquired 
above logically to those substances." 36 
This is St. Thomas' general picture, one which he takes the trouble to repeat in the 
very same paragraph when he begins the word by word paraphrase of Aristotle. 
Thus, he says: 
"Therefore, he [Aristotle] says, firstly, that since many things have been said in 
Book 7, according to logical consideration, about substance, if is necessary to 
syl/ogize Jrom those things which have been said, so that what have been said 
according to logical consideration will be applied to existing natural things. "37 
32. CM 7.1 (1245-1246 and cf. 1269). We by no means wish to neglect Book 9, but we are incIined to 
think i! belongs to a more comparative, less absolu te, mode of consideration of ens, one already 
pointing us towards the primary substances. Cf. ST. THOMAS, ln Phys. 2.10 (ed. Maggiolo, #240) as 
weil as CM 5.9 (889). For an indication of the importance of Book 9 in St. Thomas' metaphysical 
schema, see our paper, "The Number and Order of St. Thomas' Five Ways", Downside Review 92 
(1974), especially pp. 11-17. 
33. Cf. our just mentioned paper, at p. 1. Also of interest in this regard are the remarks of 
St. Albert, Metaphysica, bk. 3, tr. 3, c. 1 (ed. Cologne 16/1, 139.1-9), concerning the order to be 
found (or not found) in Aristotle's procedure: who should be more orderly th an the wise man? 
Doig, p. 240, speaking of "the numerous explanations of the connection between the various books, 
and ev en of the connections between the parts of individual books", judges that "points concerning 
method made in this regard are of Iittle use in an attempt to grasp the metaphysics at work in 
Aquinas' mind when he wrote." The reader will see by our procedure how strongly we disagree with 
this. . 
34. Cf. below, n. 89 concerning St. Albert's opinion. 
35. Such nomenclature is justified by the way St. Thomas spealcs al, e.g" CM 7.17 (1658). 
36. CM8.1 (1681). 
37. Ibid. 
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The words we have underlined represent what St. Thomas is working with in 
Aristotle. One can see that St. Thomas is taking it upon himself to contrast the two 
books on the basis of the modes of consideration. 38 
This contrast is carried over into what cornes next in Book 8, namely Aristotle's 
review of what has been seen about substance and his proposaI of what remains to be 
seen. St. Thomas divides Aristotle's presentation of substances so that Aristotle is 
first speaking about "substances existing in reality" [quae dicuntur substantiae in 
rerum natura existentes].39 Sorne of these aIl admit, viz sensible substances. Sorne are 
proposed by a few people, viz the Platonic Ideas and the mathematicals. The other 
division of substance is "according to the viewpoint of the notion" [secundum rationis 
acceptionemVo One of these is the quiddity or "what it is" of the natural thing. The 
other is the substance in the doctrine that genus is more a substance than species, 
universal more than singular (which doctrine ties in with the argument concerning 
the Ideas). 
This division having been made, St. Thomas understands Aristotle's statement 
of what has been do ne and what remains to be done in accordance with it. In Book 7 
we have had the complete discussion concerning substance and notions [de rationibus 
et de substantia], i.e. the quiddity has been discussed, and the univers al has been 
shown not to be substance. It remains to discuss substances existing in reality 
[substantias ... quae in rerum natura existunt].41 The ones posited by a few will be 
discussed in the last books (13 and 14, presumably). Now (in the present Book 8), we 
will discuss those substances which aIl admit are, i.e. the sensible ones [quas omnes 
confitentur esse; 42 this is esse as in rerum natura subsistere].43 
Enough has been said to show the importance ofthis distinction between logical 
and concrete or existential consideration for the Metaphysics as read by St. Thomas. 
Let us now look at the way St. Thomas uses the distinction in various stages of CM 7 
and 8. We should note first of aIl that St. Thomas had already announced that he 
understood the distinction between 7 and 8 in the way we have just seen. He did so at 
7.3, in explaining for the first time the order of procedure in treating of sensible 
substances. He says: 
38. It need hardly be said that our procedure of underlining the words of Aristotle in St. Thomas' 
paraphrase is highly approximative. Nevertheless. it serves to give the general picture of the 
commentator at work. 
The words 1 have underlined represent what St. Thomas is working with in Aristotle, with the 
exception of the word "ilaque" in "Ex his ilaque diclis syl/ogizare OpOrle!" (at #691, in the Latin 
Aristotle of the Cathala-Spiazzi edition of CM). That this word was actually in St. Thomas' text 
seems indicated by the rubrics at CM 7.3 (1306). 1 mention this word only because it is barely 
conceivable that St. Thomas is giving it the sense of "ita": "From the things so said ..... This would 
be an opening to introduce the theme of the diverse modes of speaking and considering, as 
distinguishing the two books. 
39. CM 8.1 (1683). 
40. CM 8.1 (1684). 
41. CM 8.1 (1685). 
42. Ibid. 
43. CM 8.1 (1683). Henceforth. we will sometimes make references to CM directly in the text. 
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" ... it is divided into two parts. In the first he determines concerning the essence 
of sensible substances by means of logical and common notions [per raliones 
logicas et communes]. In the second part, through the princip les of sensible 
substances, in Book 8, where it says: 'Ex his itaque dictis syllogizare oportet.' " 44 
Now, here, St. Thomas divides Book 7 (i.e. the remaining larger part, for he is 
now at Aristotle's 7.4) into two parts: 
"The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows us of what sort is the 
essence of sensible substances. In the second, he shows that this sort of essence 
has the role [ratio] of principle and cause, there [where it says] 'Quod autem 
oportet' ".45 
Thus St. Thomas sees Aristotle's 7.17, corresponding to his own lectio 17, the last 
lectio of the book, as a distinct step in Book 7. 
And indeed, if we look at the beginning of lectio 17, we find a most interesting 
assessment of what has already been done and of what there remains for Aristotle to 
do. St. Thomas says: 
"The Philosopher, in the beginning of this Book 7, was promising that he would 
treat of [that] substance of sensible things which is the 'what is being' [quod quid 
erat esse],46 which he made known logically [logice notificavit], showing that 
those things which are predicated by virtue of themselves [per se] pertain to the 
'what the thing is' [quod quid est]: from which [procedure] it was not yet 
manifest what is the substance which is quod quid erat esse. Now, this substance 
the Platonists said was the universals, which are separated species: which 
Aristotle disproved immediately above. Thus, it remained, that the Philosopher 
himself show what in reality [secundum rem] is the substance, which is quod quid 
erat esse. And with a view to showing this, he lays down as a preliminary 
[praemittit] that the substance, which is quod quid erat esse, has the role of 
principle and cause: and that is the intention of this chapter." 47 
Here, then, once more, we have the characterization of Book Ts treatment, and 
most explicitly of its positive part, as a logical presentation. And it is made perfectly 
clear that St. Thomas regards what Aristotle has so far done as falling short of 
knowledge of the real. The chapter 17 itself is assigned the doctrine that the substance 
as quod quid erat esse is a principle and a cause, just as St. Thomas said in 7.3 (1306). 
And we see that this is regarded as a kind of preliminary point, preparatory for the 
treatment of the reality of quidditative substance. 
But there is more here which pertains to our study, in the word-by-word 
presentation of Aristotle. St. Thomas says: 
44. CM 7.3 (1306). On the significance of the world "principles" in this statement, cf. below, pp.312-315. 
45. The text of Aristotle, as commented upon by St. Thomas, at 7.17 (1648) actually has "quiâ', not 
"quoâ'. 
46. We will generally leave in Latin this Aristotelian formula. On its Aristotelian sense, cf. J. OWENS, 
The Doctrine of Being in the Aristote/ian Metaphysics, Toronto, 1963 (2 nd ed.): P{)ntifical lnï/ilu/r of 
Mediaeval Studies, pp. 180-188. 
47. CM 7.17 (1648). 
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"He therefore says firstly that now that it has been shown that nothing of things 
said universally is substance, as the Platonists held, let us say what in truth must 
be called 'substance', viz which is quod quid erat esse, a~d of what sort this 
substance is: whether, that is, it is form, or matter, or something like that; and 
this, 1 say, let us say inserting or announcing, as il were, a starting-point other 
th an that logical starting-point, by which we entered, at the beginning of Book 7, 
into the investigation of the aforesaid substance ... And he adds what that other 
starting-point is by which one is to enter into the proposed inquiry, saying that 
Jrom here one is ta proceed towards the manifestation of the aforementioned 
substance, that we know that in the substance itself there is [or: it is] sorne 
principle and some cause." 48 
Here we see that the new starting-point is not regarded as logical, and that its 
positive content is that in the substance (the composite, apparently), it (the reality 
which is, or which lies behind, the quiddity) is a principle and a cause. One can see to 
what extent St. Thomas' procedure constitutes a definite interpretation by consi-
dering that for St. Albert, at this point, not only has chapter 17 been treated as part of 
the treatise on substance as non-universal (although as a kind ofreturn to the truth at 
the end of it),49 but we read this: 
"Therefore, let us begin by saying that, certainly, of the composite sensible 
substance, which is the 'this something', there is sorne principle and sorne cause 
which is the quiddity of it. And though we showed this above through the 
definition, nevertheless now, in order that the doctrine be more certain, we will 
show the same thing through the natural question about anything whatsoever, 
and these two manifestations are logical. Hence, therefore, it will be c1ear that 
such substances have sorne substance [as] principle and cause." 50 
Albert has favoured the "iterum" in Aristotle's text,51 thus understanding that the 
quiddity has already been shown as principle and cause. And while he says this was 
done by means of the definition, he regards the novelty of the present moment, not as 
the very doctrine of "cause and principle", as in St. Thomas, but in the technique of 
using the doctrine of natural questions. Moreover, almost as if he meant to contradict 
the text of St. Thomas' CM, he says that this second approach, like the first, is 
logical. 52 
Turning back to St. Thomas, we have now seen that for him Book 7 differs from 
Book 8 in that the former uses logical consideration while the latter treats of the 
48. Ibid. The underlining represents the text of Aristotlc. 
Il is to be noted that Doig, who gives much prominence to "the logical method" in his reconstruction 
of St. Thomas' metaphysics (cf. e.g. pp. 306-311), never cites or refers to this paragraph of CM. 
49. Cf. ALRI.RT, Metaphysica, bk. 7, tr. 5, c. 8 (ed. Cologne 16/2, 383.73-384.3). 
50. Ibid.. 384.10-20. 
51. The Latin of Aristotle at 1041a6, in the Cologne ed. of Albert, 383.82, reads: "Quid autem oportet 
dicere et quale quid substantiam, iterum, aliud tamquam principium facientes, dicimus ... " The word 
"iterum" docs not figure in Albert's paraphrase, but it sec ms to be rel1ected in the idea that the 
doctrine has already been taught. 
52. We presume that Albert's Metaphysica was written no! much latcr than 1262-1263 (cf. B. GEYER, in 
ed. Cologne 16/1, p. VlIl), and thus antedates CM in ail probability (Cf. J. A. WEISHEIPL, Friar 
Thomas D'Aquino, Garden City, N.Y., 1974: Doubleday, 379). 
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principles proper to eXlstmg substances. And we have seen that 7.17 marks a 
transition to the new mode of consideration, seemingly by shifting the approach from 
definition to causality. However, we must now look further at Book 7, for while 
globally we can say it employs logical consideration, this is not the whole story for St. 
Thomas. 
The most telling passage for the study of the situation is CM 7.11 (1535-1536). 
Aristotle, at an earlier point in Book 7, had concluded that the quiddity, and the 
thing whose quiddity it is, are identical, and even notionally identical. Non-identity 
of these means that one is faced with mere ens per accidens. 53 However, now, at 
Metaph. 7.11 (1037 a33-b7), Aristot1e says that things which include matter do not 
have identity of quiddity and thing. In explaining this change of doctrine, St. Thomas 
says that the earlier doctrine was true for the logical consideration of quod quid erat 
esse. Here, at 7.11, Aristotle has "descended ta the natural princip les which are the 
matter and the form, and showed how they are diversely related ta the universal, and 
to the particuiar which subsists in nature". And sa, explains St. Thomas, Aristotle 
exclu des from his previous judgment of identity of quiddity and thing "material 
substances existing in reality" [substantias materia/es in rerum natura existentes].'4 
From this, we can see that Book 7, though for St. Thomas it is dominated by the 
logical consideration, is not entirely uniform, but involves the introduction of the real 
princip/es of things (matter and form) as weil. 
Let us now examine the procedure of "Iogical consideration", together with 
sorne statements of St. Thomas about it, to get a better idea of what is meant. We 
should begin with CM 7.3 (1308-1309). Paraphrasing Aristotle, St. Thomas says: 
"He says firstly that one must speak first of sensible substances, and quod quid 
erat esse must be shown first in them: therefore. first we will say some things 
logically about that which is quod quid erat esse. For, as was said above, this 
science has sorne affinity with logic, because of the generality of both. And sa the 
logical mode is proper to this science, and from it it fittingly begins. But he says 
he is going to speak more in a logical way about the 'what the thing is', inasmuch 
as he investigates what quod quid erat esse is, starting from the mode of 
predicating [ex modo praedicandll; for this properly pertains to logic." 55 
If we look back at CM 4.4 (572-577), concerning Aristotle, Metaph. 4.2 (IO04b 17 -26), 
we are told, in quite a long development by St. Thomas, that the dialectician and the 
philosopher caver the same field, but that the dialectician does so with less than 
scientific knowledge, treating things on the basis of their existence in notions, and not 
on the basis of the principles intrinsic to things themselves. The reason that the two 
coyer the same field is that the intelligible raies [in/enliones intelligibiles] which the 
dialectician studies coincide in extent with the beings of nature [entia naturae] which 
the philosopher studies, because ail the beings of nature fall under the consideration 
53. Cf. our paper concerning this notion, mentioned in n. 1. 
54. CM 7.11 (1536). 
55. The underlined words, except for the first and last instances of "quod quid eral esse" represent 
the text of Aristotle. 
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of reason. Examples of the intelligible roles are genus and species. St. Thomas 
explains that dialectic, called "tentative" by Aristotle, do es have a demonstrative 
phase, i.e. it has a science of the use of intelligible roles for arriving at probable 
conclusions about the real. However, use of this science, as it takes place in the 
sciences of the real, Îs probable, not demonstrative, procedure: it is not scientific 
knowledge of the real. 56 
It is clear, then, that in metaphysics, to the extent that we have genuinely to do 
with the use of logical consideration, while we have what St. Thomas calls a way of 
beginning particularly suitable for metaphysics, we do not have scientific meta-
physical procedure. 57 
Now let us consider the actual use of the logical consideration which begins the 
metaphysical study of substance as quiddity. We might remark that, in CM 7.3 
(1308), quoted above on p. 297, St. Thomas speaks as though "quad quid erat esse" 
("quiddity" for short) names something which might be considered logically, or 
might be considered philosophically. I.e. the very term "quiddity" is not seen as 
exclusively pertaining to the logical consideration of substance. And this is true also 
in CM 7.17 (1648), quoted above on p. 295. On the other hand, at CM 8.1 (1683-
1684), discussed above on p. 294, the quiddity of the natural thing is classified as 
substance "according to the viewpoint of the notion" [secundum ratianis accep-
tianem], and is contrasted with really existing substance [substantiae in rerum natura 
existentes ]. 
Here is St. Thomas paraphrasing Aristotle as actually carryîng out the logical 
consideration: 
"But this firstly îs to be known concernîng the quad quid erat esse, that it is 
necessary that il be predicated accarding ta itself[secundum se]. For those things 
which are predicated according to accompaniment [per accidens] of somethîng 
do not belong to its quad quid era! esse. For by 'quad quid erat esse of 
something' we rnean this, viz that which can fittingly be replied to the question 
posed by 'what is it ?' But when we ask about something: 'what is it? ' we cannot 
suitably reply the things which are in it according to accompaniment ; as, when it 
is asked 'what is a man?', it cannot be answered that it is 'white' or 'seated' or 
'musical'. And thus none of the things which are predicated according to 
accompaniment of sornething pertain to the quad quid erat esse of that thing : far 
'ta be musical' is nat 'far yau ta be'." 58 
One can see how little in the above cornes directly from Aristotle and how much is 
St. Thomas' presentation of Aristotle's logical consideration. It is to be noted that the 
term "quad quid erat esse" is from the start associated with the question: "what is 
it?" (which will be used in 7.17 in approaching quiddity as principle and cause). 
56. CM 4.4 (576-577). Again, it is notable that Doig makes no use of these paragraphs; perhaps 
they have to do with the disappointment he expresses concerning 572-577 generally (cf. p. 251, n. 1). 
St. Thomas in this passage does not go into the question of why there is the diversity between 
things in reason and things in reality; cf., on this, CM 1.10 (158). 
57. Il is notable that nothing is said as to why one begins this way. 
58. CM 7.3 (1309), on Aristotle at 1029b13-15. The underlined words (excepting ail but the first 
"quod quid eral esse") are Aristotle. 
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St. Thomas at this point undertakes ta explain Aristotle's use of "esse" with a 
dative, as in "tibi esse", "for you to be". He says: 
"But it must be known that in ail the following, by the expression 'being this' 
[hoc esse] or 'being for this' [huic esse], he means the quod quid erat esse of that 
thing: for example, 'being for man' [homini esse] or 'being man' [hominem esse]: 
he means that which pertains to the 'what is man'." 
And then he continues with the paraphrase: 
"Now, that which is 'being musical', i.e, the very 'what musical is', does no! 
pertain ta what you are. For if it be asked: 'what are you ?', it cannot be replied 
that you are musical. And therefore it follows that 'to be musical' is not 'for you 
ta be'; because those things which belong ta the quiddity of the musical are 
outside your quiddity, though 'musical' is predicated of you. And this is because 
you are not musical according ta yourself, that is, because 'musical' is not 
predicated of you according to itself, but according to accompaniment. That 
therefore pertains to the 'what it is' of you which you are according ta yourselj, 
that is, because it is predicated of you according to itself and not according to 
accompaniment: as, of you is predicated according to itself 'man', 'animal', 
'substance', 'rational', 'sentient' [sensibile), and other things of this sort, which 
ail pertain to the 'what it is' of you." 59 
We are engaged in speaking of real things, but we are considering them as they are 
exhibited through predication. The focus is on predicates and how they are 
predicated, even though it is the things spoken ofthat one wishes to know. Obviously 
su ch a procedure implies confidence that these discussed differences in modes of 
discourse reflect differences in things themselves. 
What is the general effect of the logical consideration of substance as quiddity, 
in that portion of Book 7 which most unquestionably in volves logical consideration, 
viz CM 7.3-5? 60 We should note that, for St. Thomas, the target of attention in 
Books 7 and 8 is the formai natural principle, the substantial form. The study of 
quiddity is seen as an approach to the substantial form. 61 The latter is distinguished 
from the concrete composite: it has sorne kind of real distinguishability.62 With the 
recourse to quiddity, or per se predication, we have before us a distinction between a 
thing and what that thing is. Our discourse takes separately the two, the thing as 
59. Ibid., on Aristotle at 1029b 15-16. 
60. We say this most unquestionably involves logical consideration because, starting with 7.6 we enter 
into a discussion of generation, which extends to 7.8 inclusively; St. Thomas says nothing to exclude 
this from logical consideration, but it can hardi y be seen as the pure article, considering that in the 
next section, 7.9-12, which returns to the topic of definition, we are told that Aristotle has 
"descended to the natural principles which are the matter and the form ... "(see above, p. 297).1t is 
constantly the introduction of the natural principles (as in discussions of generation) which 
constitutes diminution of the logical consideration. 
61. See below, pp. 304-305. 
62. 1 take it that form does not really enter into the discussion of substance until malter's existence 
has been established (through motion, generation, and corruption). I.e., first cornes substance, then 
generation and corruption reveal matter (cf. CM 8.1: 1689), and then one sees that the substantia! 
principle must have the nature of form (i.e. something analogous to the shape of the statue, but in 
the order of substance) (cf. CM 7.2: 1277). 
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subject and the "what the thing is" as predicate. Moreover, what is exhibited in this 
way is the unit y of such a predication. What is predicated is the very thing itself, i.e. 
thing and quiddity are one in notion, and not merely by accompaniment of sorne 
sort. 63 In this way, we are able to contrast what has a quiddity, a true definition, with 
su ch realities as faU short of this sort of unit y and self-containment. There is no 
quiddity in the categories other than substance, or at least only quiddity in a 
secondary sense. 64 
A notable feature of this discussion is that while at the beginning, with the talk 
about what can be predicated of"you" per se, one might think one was dealing with a 
predication such as "Socrates is aman", in fact, in the fully deve10ped logical 
consideration, the individu al is not in the picture. The subject is the definitum, 
properly so called, i.e. the species. "Man" and "man is a rational animal" : these are 
the objects of logical consideration. 65 But once one descends to the material 
individual, one is no longer having to do with the sort of unit y one observed in "man 
is a rational animal". The thing and its quiddity are no longer identical. Thus, in CM 
7.9-12, our attention is turned from the unit y of definition with definitum to the 
compositeness of definition, and indeed to this as a kind of springboard to a 
consideration of the non-definable singular (locus of the "parts" which are not "parts 
of the definition") 66 - i.e. the logical consideration itse1f is used as a means of 
directing attention beyond mere logic. 
In general, the logical consideration serves to dispiay the unit y or self-identity 
proper to substance. Moreover, it displays this unit y as a unit y of things, fully 
conceivable realities such as we commonly name in subjects and predicates. It seems 
to be above ail the need to take account of matter which forces the revision of this 
picture, and thereby forces us to the proper conception of substantial form (not a 
fully conceivable reality, not a predicable thing; not even a predicable thing taken 
abstractly, like "humanity") as cause of the unit y which is indeed found in sensible 
substances as they actually exist. 67 
Let us look now at the philosophical consideration, in sorne of those passages in 
which St. Thomas is contrasting it with the logical. We will begin with St. Thomas' 
treatment of the passage (Aristotle, Metaph. 7.3: 1029a20-27) wherein, in order to 
answer those who make substance primarily or even exc1usive1y matter, Aristotle says 
what matter reaUy is. In St. Thomas, we find: 
63. CM 7.5 (1375). 
64. Cf. especially CM 7.4 (1331-134\). The key notion in these discussions is that of per se unit y : 
cf. 1340. And this in turn suggests that behind ail the discussion of definition is substance as caught 
sight of in the theatre of generation and corruption: cf. CM 6.2 (1179). It is, therefore, we believe, 
too bad that Doig, in his meticulous exposition of CM 4.2 (at pp. 110-120), on the fact that the 
study of ens is also the study of unit y, omits aIl mention of paras. 551-552, which use generation 
and corruption to establish the sameness of ens and unum. 
65. Cf. CM 7.\\ (1536); also, 7.5 (1378). 
66. See below, pp. 307-308. 
67. On the distinction between form and quiddity. see below, pp. 305-307. 
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"Because the aforesaid argument showing that matter alone is substance seems 
to have proceeded from ignorance of matteL .. therefore he [AristotleJ conse-
quently says what matter is according to the truth of things, as declared in 
Physics, Book 1. For matter in itself cannot sufficiently be known, except 
through motion; and its investigation seems to pertain especially to the natural 
scientist. Hence the Philosopher accepts here, concerning matter, those things 
which were investigated in physics, saying: 'But 1 say matter is that ;vhich 
according to itself, that is, considered according to its own essence, in no way is 
either what, i.e. substance, or quafity, or anything of the other genera by which ens 
is divided or determined." 68 
St. Thomas thus bears down hard on the point that matter can be sufficiently known 
only through motion, and that Aristotle is here depending on what he has said in the 
Physics. And he continues: 
"And this appears primarily through motion. For it is necessary that the subject 
of change and motion be other, speaking essentially [per se Ioquendo J, th an either 
of the termini of motion: as is proved in Physics 1. Hence, since matter is the 
first subject standing under not merely motions, which are according to quality 
and quantity and the other accidents, but even [under] the changes which are 
according to substance, it is necessary that matter be other, according to its own 
essence, than ail substantial forms and their privations, which are the termini of 
generation and corruption; and not merely that it be other th an quantity and 
quality and the other accidents." 69 
Ali this St. Thomas has inserted in his insistence that it is through motion al one that a 
sufficient knowledge of the essence of matter can be had. Nothing in the text of 
Aristotle demanded this clarification: on the contrary, as we are about to see. 
St. Thomas goes on: 
"And yet, for ail that [Attamen], the Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] does not prove 
the diversity of matter from ail forms through the route of motion, which proof 
indeed is by the route of natural philosophy, but through the route of 
predication, which is proper to logic, which in Book 4 of the present work he 
says is akin to this [present] science." 70 
St. Thomas seems here somewhat taken aback by Aristotle's procedure. He go es on 
to explain Aristotle's argument, which supposes a real distinction between subject 
and predicate. St. Thomas has to relate this to what he caUs "denominative" or 
"concretive" predication, rather than univocal, essential predication. But it is clear 
that for St. Thomas, Aristotle's doctrine really depends on the physical argument. 71 
To this it should be added that later (Aristotle, Metaph. 8.1: 1042a32-b8) we 
have matter actuaUy presented by me ans of the doctrines of the Physics, and 
St. Thomas once more insists: "From this argument of Aristotle, it is clear that 
68. CM 7.2 (1285). The underlining is the AristotIe tex!. 
69. CM 7.2 (1286). 
70. CM 7.2 (1287). 
71. CM 7.2 (1288-1289). 
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substantial generation and corruption are the starting-point for coming to a 
knowledge of first matter." 72 Thus, the procedure of Aristotle in Metaph. 7.3 is seen 
by St. Thomas as provision al at best. Furthermore, while we found in the foregoing 
no explicit formula su ch as "philosophical consideration", nevertheless we did have 
the contrast between Aristotle's logical procedure and the other procedure, the only 
one which gives "sufficient knowledge" of matter. 
Having looked at the text of CM 7.2 on matter, let us look again at CM 7.11 
(1535-1536). What we mean to focus upon is what characterizes the properly 
philosophical consideration. Previously Aristotle had not excluded material subs-
tances from his judgment that quiddity and thing are identical. St. Thomas points out 
that the quiddity is what is signified by the definition,73 and that the individual is not 
defined. 74 Thus, individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, lies 
outside the quiddity. But, says St. Thomas: 
"it is impossible that the species be in reality [in rerum natura esse] unless in 'this 
individual'. Thus, it is necessary that any real thing [res naturae], if it have 
matter which is part of the species, which pertains to the 'what it is', also have 
individual matter, which does not pertain to the 'what it is'. Hence, no real thing 
[res naturae], if it has matter, is the very 'what it is', but is that which has it: as 
Socrates is not humanity, but is that which has humanity. But ifit were possible 
for there to be a man composed of body and soul, who were not 'this man' 
composed out of 'this body' and 'this soul', nevertheless he would be his quod 
quid erat esse, though he had matter. [1536] But though man outside the singular 
does not exist really [non sit in rerum natura], he does exist in notion [est, tamen, 
in ratione], which pertains to logical consideration. And so above, where he 
[Aristotle] considered logically concerning quod quid erat esse, he did not 
exclude material substances, that in them also the 'what it is' be identical with 
that to which it belongs. For common 'man' [homo communis] is identical with 
his 'what it is', logically speaking. But now, after he has descended to the natural 
principles which are the matter and the form, and has shown how they are 
diversely related to the universal, and to the particular which subsists in nature 
[particulare quod subsistit in natura], he excepts here from that which he said 
above had 'what it is' identical with thing, material substances existing in reality' 
[substantias materiales in rerum natura existentes]. But it remains that those 
substances which are forms alone subsisting [formae tantum subsistentes] do not 
have something through which they are individuated, which is outside the notion 
of the thing or of the species signifying 'what it is'. And in them it is true 
unqualifiedly that any of them is its quod quid erat esse." 75 
What Aristotle has done, in moving, "descending", from logical to philosophical 
consideration, is to introduce the natural principles, the matter and the form, and to 
show how they stand with respect to the universal, and to the particular which 
subsists in nature. Just as later, at 7.17, when St. Thomas wishes to exemplify what it 
wou Id be finally to say what in reality the quiddity is, he says : "whether it be form, or 
72. CM 8.1 (1689). 
73. Cf. also CM 7.5 (1378). 
74. Cf. also CM 7.10 (1493-1496); but also 7.15 (1617-1618). 
75. CM 7.11 (1535-1536). 
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matter, or something like that",16 so also here we have the reference to matter and 
form. Similarly, when we come to Book 8, which St. Thomas presents as the major 
shift to philosophical consideration, we see that we are to consider the substances 
through their own principles, matter and form. 77 And earlier, in CM 4.4, it was the 
mark of the proper demonstrative sciences of the real, both "philosophy", i.e. 
metaphysics, and the other particular sciences, that in their study of real things [de 
rebus naturae] they use the principles of things, whereas the tentative dialectic, or 
logical consideration associated with the science of the real, made use of princip les 
"outside the nature of things" [extranea a natura rerum]. 78 
The field of consideration of the philosopher is given, here in 7.11, as the res 
naturae, that which exists in rerum natura, as distinguished from that which "is, in 
notion". It is the same contrast, between ens naturae and ens rationis, that we saw in 
4.4. 79 The issue is not materiality as such, nor even individuality, but ultimately 
whatever conditions prevail as regards being in reality. Again, this agrees with 7.17: 
the philosopher considers the existence of things, the truth of things; 80 and with 7.13, 
where it is said that the metaphysician, who considers things as enlia, brings the 
conditions of actual existence into his discourse. 81 
lt is to be noted also, concerning 7.11, that when St. Thomas speaks of "res 
naturae" and "in rerum natura existens", the word "nature", while it may very well 
relate to motion, is not meant to limit the consideration to the things studied properly 
by the physicist, the natural philosopher. What is meant is the field of beings outside 
the mind, whether material or immaterial, as is shown by the conclusion concerning 
subsistent forms. These are res naturae. Still, the reference to nature, with its 
association with motion, is not accidentaI. For us, motion is the route to knowledge 
of actuality.82 
Lastly, we should reflect that the metaphysicaljudgment involved here in Book 7 
was that a thing and its quiddity are identical. Using the logical consideration, 
Aristotle showed this in a probable way, concerning aU entia per se. Once matter and 
form began to make their presence feh, the judgment had ta be revised, so as to 
exclu de material substances in their real existence. From a metaphysical point of 
view, the probable judgment will find verification unqualifiedly only with the 
bringing on the scene of subsisting form. 
We have said enough as to the philosophical point ofview as contrasted with the 
logical. The general ide a of St. Thomas' reading of Books 7 and 8 is a movement of 
76. See above, p. 296. 
77. CM 8.1 (1686 and 1681). 
78. CM 4.4 (574-577). Notice also, in 7.2 (1280): "principia rei". 
79. Above, pp. 297-298. 
80. CM 7.17 (1658): ..... existentiam reL existentiam quaerit rerum ... secundum rei veritatem ..... 
81. CM 7.13 (\576): "Hic enim accipit di ci de subiecto, quod est in se aliqua res et inest alicui subiecto 
existenti in actu." 
82. Cf. CM 9.3 (1805-1806). 
303 
LA WRENCE DEWAN 
the mind, from the mind as taking things on its, the min d's, own terms, to a greater 
and greater submission to things themselves. This is brought about primarily through 
the consideration of motion, generation and corruption. 
Professor Doig has remarked that "Aristotle ends by rejecting the entire 
discussion of the logical investigation, but Thomas do es not (p. 280, n. 1)". This 
hardly does justice to the situation. Whatever be the truth about Aristotle, 
St. Thomas makes il a major point that the logical consideration is inadequate, does 
not give us the real quiddity, and requires completion by the properly scientific 
metaphysical treatment. 
Ill. ST. THOMAS AND SUBSTANTIAL FORM 
Thusfar, we have seen that the science of metaphysics, as considerativa entis, is 
primarily demonstrative by means of the formai cause. We have also seen that, in his 
reading of the main treatment of material beings as beings in Aristotle's Metaphysics, 
St. Thomas saw the movement of the discussion as starting with logical consideration 
and ending with philosophical consideration, i.e. with the presentation of the proper 
principles of sensible substances, the matter and the farm and their unity. Clearly, 
since matter is in no way a cause of beings as beings, the primary consideration of 
Book 8 is of substantial form as cause of being. However, as we have also seen, the 
movement of Books 7 and 8 is not abrupt. Already, in Book 7, there is something of 
the philosophical consideration. What we wish to do in this section is to provide a 
few notes on St. Thomas' reading of Books 7 and 8 as a graduai manifestation of the 
formai cause. 
a) Substantial Form the Target 
It is remarkable that already, at the beginning of Book 7, St. Thomas sees the 
primary interest of Aristotle as bearing upon substance in the sense of subject,8l 
Then, in the subject, it is the substantial form which is to be the chief target of 
investigation.84 St. Thomas also speaks of it as the particular farm [forma particu-
laris].85 It is this which is presented at the very beginning, albeit in barest outline, as 
the cause of ens: matter is not constituted as a being actually [ens actu] except 
through form; thus, form is the "because of which [propter quod] ".86 And already we 
note even in what is a rather "physical" discussion by Aristotle (Metaph. 7.3: 
1029al-9), a phenomenon we will be studying in more detail in a moment, name1y 
St. Thomas' careful distinction between form and species. Aristotle is using the 
83. CM 7.2 (1274), concerning Aristotle at 1028b37-29al. While the Latin of Aristotle in the Cathala-
Spiazzi ed. has: "Propter quod primum de hoc determinandum est" and this is identical with the 
trans/ario media text in Albert, Metaphysica (ed. Cologne 1612, 322.83), St. Thomas makes no 
mention of the "primum". He speaks rather as though substance as subject is what the investigation, 
not merely begins with, but is mainly about. 
84. CM 7.2 (1296). 
85. CM'7.2 (1276-1277). 
86. CM 7.2 (1278). 
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bronze statue to convey what he means by matter, form, and composite. Concerning 
the form, St. Thomas seems to have read : "the shape, as the f orm of the species", and 
he is quick to paraphrase: "that is, giving the species". The shape is the form, and the 
form gives the species. St. Thomas is distinguishing between form, the physical 
principle, and species, the effect of the form found in our intellectual conception of 
the thing (the species, as we will see, is a composite of form and matter, taken 
universally)Y I.e., St. Thomas is already eager to distinguish what pertains more to 
logical consideration, the species, from what pertains to metaphysics in its properly 
scientific character, the substantial form. 
While there is sorne ambiguity in the treatment of the division at CM 7.2 (1297 
and following), the "third division" spoken of should be particular Jorm. The parts of 
the third division should be sensible substances and non-sensible substances, i.e. 
forms in matter and forms subsisting by themselves. What is to be determined 
concerning sensible form is the quod quid erat esse, the quiddity and essence of the 
thing (1299). At 1302, it is c1ear that we are after "Jormae sensibiles" which are 
'~formae in materia", as less remote from sense than the separate entities, and so more 
knowable for us. But, again, we see that even our road to the substantial forms of 
sensible things must pass through such non-entities or near non-entities as accidents, 
motion, and privations (1304). 
In fact, what we learn least about here is why we are going to study the quiddity 
(cf. 1299). It seems to be somewhat different from substance as subject, to judge by 
the list given in 1270-1274. It is to be noted that here at the outset, before we enter 
into the full logical consideration (it would seem), quod quid erat esse is explained 
(1275) as something which does not fall into the order of predicaments except as 
formai principle. Thus, it sounds like "humanity", rather than "rational animal". It 
will be taken as "rational animal" in the full-tledged logical consideration (CM 7.5 : 
1378). 
It remains that, in the light of St. Thomas' 7.2, we are prepared for a study of 
substantial form. We are not going to be altogether puzzled to find quiddity as the 
target in 7.3, since we have been forewarned in 1299. But we cannot be altogether 
content. Thus, St. Thomas himself, at CM 7.13 (1566-1567), when explaining the list 
of modes of substance given by Aristotle at Metaph. 7.13 (1038bl-8), says that while 
at the beginning of Book 7 (i.e. 7.3: 1028b33-1029a2) Aristotle divided the subject in 
three, viz the matter, the form, and the composite, here in 7.13 he uses quod quid erat 
esse in place ofJorm, "because it is now c1ear that the quod quid erat esse stands on the 
side of form" (1567). Hence, it cannot have been all that c1ear where we are now, i.e. 
at 7.3, where, expecting a treatise on form, we get one on quiddity. 
b) Form and Species 
While the study is of quiddity, we are quickly obliged to turn our attention 
towards things in the concrete. Aln;ady in CM 7.6-8, on generation, This is so. 
87. See below, pp. 30b-310. 
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However, the passages to which 1 wish to call attention are in 7.9-11, which we have 
seen St. Thomas himself describe as a des cent from the logical consideration into the 
natural princip les. 88 In those passages we shall look at St. Thomas' (previously 
mentioned) careful distinction between the species or quiddity, and the substantial 
form. This care of his has the effect of keeping before the mind the secondary 
and derivative character of the issues in Book 7 (to 7.16). Beyond the quiddity 
lies the substantial form, which is the real target of our metaphysical quest. 
At the very beginning ofthis section of CM, i.e. in 7.9, St. Thomas explains the 
distinction between quiddity and substantial form. He has already presented the 
problem which Aristotle has proposed (and to which we will refer later), but before 
coming to Aristotle's solutions, he introduces a lengthy note to the reader. 
Concerning the definitions of things, and their essences, he tells us, there are two 
opinions. Sorne say that the essence of the species is the form itself: e.g. that the 
entire essence of man is the sou!. Thus, the words "humanity" and "soul" are 
understood to name exactly the same thing: it is called "form of the part" inasmuch 
as it perfects the matter and makes it to be actually; and it is called "form of the 
whole" inasmuch as through it the whole thing is given a place in a species. And thus 
these people maintain that no parts of the matter are posited in the definition 
indicating the species, but rather only the formai principles of the species. Averroes 
and others seem to hold this view. 89 
This opinion, says St. Thomas, seems to be against the intention of Aristotle. 
Above, in Book 6, he said that natural things have sensible matter in their definitions. 
Nor can it be said that natural substances are defined by that which is not of their 
essences: substances do not have definition by addition (i.e. of things external to the 
precise thing defined), but only accidents are so defined, as was said earlier in the 
Metaph. Hence, it remains that sensible matter is part of the essence of natural 
substances, not only as regards individuals, but even as regards the very species: for 
88. See above. p. 297. 
89. Albert the Great seems to be among those who identify form and quiddity, to judge by his 
Metaphysica bk. 7, tr. l, c. 1 (ed. Cologne 1612,316.28-41). Since this passage is Albert's view of 
the distinction between Book 7 and Book 8, we quote at length: "Furthermore, the principles of 
substance are matter and form, and especially form i5 the principle of substance, and it is neces5ary 
that this [the form, as principle of substance] be determined in two ways: in one way, according as 
it is the entire being [totum esse] of first substance and its quiddity, which is signified by the 
definition; and it is necessary that we inquire concerning substance in this way in this 7th Book of 
this first philosophy. But it is to be considered in another way inasmuch as it is a certain form and 
nature considered in itself, diverse from matter, which is the other part of the composite, as the soul 
is the form of man not predicated of him, and in this way it is also called 'quiddity' by sorne, 
speaking broadly but improperly. And in this way we will consider form in the next book, which 
is the 8th Book of this first philosophy." The form and the quiddity seem to be the same thing 
here. At Ibid. bk. 8, tr. l, c. 1 (389.9-21), we seem to have the same position, and the sameness is 
rather explicit: " ... ostendemus eandem substantiam ad quam refertur diffinitio, esse formam et 
actum et naturam diffiniti ... " (389.14-15). At bk. 8, tr. 1, c. 3 (391.46-61), however, we seem!O be 
going to treat of form as predicable (391.60). - As regards the division of the two books, Albert's 
distinction between form as quiddity and form as form or nature or aet eontains no suggestion of 
St. Thomas' contrast bctween logical consideration and consideration of the proper principles of 
things; in St. Albert, there seems to be none of the diminishing of the ontological status of quiddity 
which is implied in St. Thomas' c1assifying of it as substance "from the viewpoint of reason" 
(CM 8.1: 1684). 
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definitions are given, not of individu aIs, but of species. - Here we see that 
St, Thomas does not depend on his reading of Metaph. 7.10-11 for his position, but 
on much c1earer previous statements of Aristotle. 9o 
Thus, he continues, there is another opinion, followed by Avicenna, according 
to which the "form of the whole", which is the very quiddity of the species, d(ffers 
from the "form of the part", as a who le from a part: for the quiddity of the species is 
a composite out of matter and form, but not, neverthe\ess, out of "this form" and 
"this individu al matter". Out of these, the individual, e.g. Socrates or Callias, is 
composed. This is the opinion of Aristotle here, says St. Thomas. Aristotle brings in 
this opinion (St. Thomas must mean : in a c1ear way) in order to exclude the opinion 
of Plato concerning the Ideas. Plato said that the species of natural things are existing 
by themselves without sensible matter, as though sensible matter were not in sorne 
way part of the species. Thus, once it is shown that sensible matter is part of the 
species in natural things, it is shown that it is impossible for the species of natural 
things to be without matter: as man without flesh and bones, etc. 
Here, St. Thomas seems to be referring to what Aristotle says in 7.11, where the 
argument is to the point that not only in natural things, but even in mathematicals, 
there is a matter in the definition. Cf. Aristotle at 1036b22-30. It is of sorne 
importance to pin point just where Aristotle so expresses himself according to 
St. Thomas, since in other places in the discussion (e.g. Metaph. 7.10: 1036a 13-25) 
St. Thomas sees Aristotle as favouring neither opinion over the other (CM 7.10: 
1498-1500). St. Thomas will, in general, interpret the discussion according to what he 
sees as the opinion of Aristotle, i.e. the distinction between form and quiddity of the 
species. 
Since St. Thomas has himself called attention so explicitly and deliberately to 
this distinction, let us see how it shows up in his presentation of Aristotle. The 
phenomenon is difficult to present because of the instability of the vocabulary, as 
used by the two authors. The Latin Aristotle often has "species" where St. Thomas 
wiIJ wish to interpret by using the word "forma". St. Thomas, on the other hand, uses 
"species" for the quiddity as a whole. Again, Aristotle reserves, for the most part, the 
word "matter" to refer to what belongs to the individual as such, whereas 
St. Thomas, exploiting sorne few remarks of Aristotle, makes constant use of a 
distinction between common matter and individual matter. 
Before 100 king at the texts we might recall the problems which Aristotle is facing 
in this part of Metaph. 7. Whereas the earlier presentation of substance and definition 
had focussed upon the thoroughgoing unit y of definition and definitum, the present 
section (Aristotle's chapters 10-12) considers definition as composite discourse, as a 
formula composed of parts, e.g. "rational animal". And the problem is that there 
does not seem to be thoroughgoing correspondence between the parts of the 
definition and the parts of the thing defined. Sometimes the parts of the thing are parts 
of the definition (as letters occur in the definition of a syllable), and sometimes they 
90. CM 7.9 (1468). The point that the individual is no! defined. i! is true. is taken from a clear 
subsequent statement of Aristotle (7.10: 1036a2-5). 
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are not (the semi-circ1e is not part of the definition of the circ1e). Another 
problematic feature of the same situation is that sorne parts are prior to the whole (as 
letter to syllable) or at least simultaneous (as the heart or brain to the animal), and 
sorne are posterior (as finger to animal, and semi-circ1e to circ1e).91 - One of the 
results of the exploration of the situation so presented is that we see an ambiguity in 
our speech between two meanings of such words as "the circle", and so are led to 
distinguish two targets of attention in thought - "the circle" as the definable thing, 
and "the circle" as the con crete thing. 92 Another result is that we come to see that 
even within the definable reality as such, there is composition, there are parts, there is 
the structure of "this in this" (as form in matter). 93 
We will look first at CM 7.10. We should note, in 1482, the reason given by 
St. Thomas for Aristotle's having to repeat and clarify the already given solution. 
Aristotle has not shown how the parts are prior and posterior, nor again has he 
distinguished the universal composite from the particular composite, nor also the 
species from the form. 
Then, commenting on Aristotle at 1035b27-33, St. Thomas says: 
"Nevertheless, it must be known that this composite which is animal or man can 
be taken in two ways: either as universal or as singular. As universal : as 'man' 
and 'animal'. As singular: as 'Socrates' and 'Callias'. And so he [Aristotle] says 
that man and horse and what sa [ital are in singulars, but said universal/y, as 'man' 
and 'horse', are not substance, i.e. are not form alone, but are a certain whole-
together [simul totum quoddam] composed out of determinate matter and 
determinate form; not indeed as singularly, but universally. For 'man' says 
something composed out of soul and body, but not out of this soul and this 
body. But 'the singular' says something composed out of the ultimate matter, i.e. 
individual matter ... " 94 
The universally-signified species are not "substance", says Aristotle, and St. Thomas 
quickly identifies this "substance" as the substantial form. Then, in the next 
paragraph, where Aristotle might very weil seem to be distinguishing various types of 
part, i.e. 1035b31-33, St. Thomas rather interprets this as a distinction ofmatters. He 
says: 
"Th us, therefore, it is clear that matter is part of the species. But 'species' we here 
understand not as form alone, but as quod quid erat esse. And it is clear also that 
matter is a part of that whole which is out of the species and the matter, i.e. the 
singular [whole), which signifies the nature of the species in this determinate 
matter. For matter is a part of the composite. But the composite is both the 
universal and the singular." 95 
Once again, St. Thomas has Aristotle including matter in the quiddity, and setting it 
off carefully from the "form alone". Then, subsequently, the quiddity or species is 
cou pied with further matter to constitute the singular. 
91. Cf. CM 7.9 (1460-1466). 
92. Cf. CM 7.9 (1480-1481) concerning Aristotle at 7.10 (l035bl-J). 
93. Cf. A RISTOTLE, Melaph 7.11 (1036b22-24) and CM 7.11 (1517). 
94. CM 7.10 (1490). The undcrlining is the text of Aristotle. 
95. CM 7.10 (1491). Aristotle underlined. 
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Later in 7.10, commenting on the fact that the definition is of the universal only, 
St. Thomas explains that by the definition a thing is supposed to be known; and it is 
clear that when they are absent, individual things are not known, even though we still 
possess the definitions. Thus, the definitions do not bear directly on the individuals. 
And the reason for this is that matter, which is the princip le of individuation, is 
according to itself unknown, and is known only throughform, from which the notion 
of the universal is taken. And 50 singulars are not known in their absence except 
through universals. - Here, we see the distinction between form and universal (i.e. 
species) maintained: the form is the principle of the universal. 96 We shall see more of 
this in a moment. 
Still in 7.10, St. Thomas goes on to paraphrase and comment on the few words 
of conclusion of Aristotle at 1036aI2-13. He says: 
"He [Aristotle] concludes, therefore, that it has been said how things stand 
concerning who/e and part, and concerning prior and posterior, i.e. of what is the 
part a part, and how it is prior and how posterior. For the parts of the individual 
matter are parts of the composite singular, but not of the species, nor of the 
form. But the parts of the universal matter are parts of the species, but not of the 
form. And because the universal is defined, and not the singular, therefore the 
parts of the individual matter are not placed in the definition, but only the parts 
of the corn mon matter, together with the form or the parts of the form." 97 
Here again, we see how the analysis keeps the form clearly in view at ail times, in 
distinction from the species. We might notice also that the form itself is conceived by 
St. Thomas as susceptible ta having parts. 
We move now to CM 7.11. For our present purposes, 1529-1532, wherein 
St. Thomas is commenting on Aristotle at 1037a21-33, is ail of interest. Aristotle is 
recapitulating what he has done since the beginning of Book 7. If, in the interests of 
brcvity, we begin at 1037 a24, we have Aristotle saying: 
"And that in the notion of the substance, what so are parts, as matter, will not be 
included. For neither are they parts of that substance, but of the whole. But of 
this there is in a way a notion and there is not. For, with matter, there is not. For 
that is indeterminate. But according to the first substance, there is, as of man the 
notion of the sou!. For the substance is the species, which is within, out of which 
and the matter the who le substance is said." 98 
And here is St. Thomas' presentation: 
"Also, it has been said that in the notion of the substance, i.e. of the form, are no! 
placed the parts which are parts of the substance as matter, because such [parts] 
are not parts of that substance, i.e. of the form, but parts of the composite who/e. 
"[ 1530] Of which composite, in a way there is a definition, in a way there is no/. 
For if it be taken with matter, i.e. individu al [matter], there is no definition of it, 
96. Cf. CM 7.10 (1495-1496). 
97. Ibid. 1497. Aristotle underlined. 
98. In the Cathala-Spiazzi edition of CM, the Aristotle text 11639. - The text of Aristotle St.Thoma~ 
is using as close enough to this to give the reader the picture of St. Thomas' commenting which 1 wish 
to convey. Obviously. the mere putting into English forces the addition of words here and there. 
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for sin guI ars are not defined, as was shown above. For which the reason is that 
such individual matter is an unfinished [infinitum] and indeterminate something. 
For matter is not finished except through form. 
"But the composite taken according to the first substance, i.e. according to the 
form, has a definition. For the composite taken in [its] species [in specie] is 
defined, not according to the individua!. [1531] But just as the individual is 
individu al through the matter, so each thing is placed in its species through the 
form. For man is not man because he has flesh and bones but from this, 
that he has rational soul in flesh and bones. Whence it is necessary that 
the definition of the species be taken from the form, and that in the defi-
nition of the species be placed only those parts of matter in which the form is 
primarily and principally. As the notion of man is that which is of the soul. For 
from this, man is man, that he has such a sou!. And because of this, if man is 
defined, it is necessary that he be defined through the soul, and that nevertheless 
in his definition be placed the parts of the body in which primarily is the soul, 
such as the heart or the brain, as he said above. 
"[ 1532] For the very substance of which matter is not a part is the species, i.e. the 
form, which is within the matter, out of which form and the matter the whole 
substance is said, i.e. is determined and defined ... " 99 
The reader can see how relentlessly St. Thomas maintains the distinction between 
species and form, with the idea that the species inc1udes matter, and that thus matter 
is part of the definition. Even where the text of Aristotle has "species", St. Thomas 
does not hesitate to say it means "form". 
The result of ail this is that St. Thomas keeps a firm ho Id on the distinction 
between logical consideration, to which properly the species belongs, and philo-
sophical consideration, to which belong matter and form as principles of the 
composite substance. The species is the individu al composite taken universally. The 
real ground for 50 taking it is the particular form. 
c) Form and Causality 
We have done enough to illustrate how St. Thomas, even within CM 7, keeps in 
view the distinction between quiddity and form, between "substance according to 
reason" and "substance as it exists".loo We wish now to reconsider the second c1ear 
step towards the real principles of things noted by St. Thomas himself in his 
interpretation of Aristotle, viz the "new beginning" in 7.17. 
Why is this such a new beginning? We have seen that it is a beginning other than 
the logical one, and that it consists precisely in saying that within the substance, there 
is a principle, a cause. lOI While from our point of view (that of interest in the 
substantial form) the word "in" or "within" is highly interesting,102 nevertheless it is 
99. CM 7.11 (1529-1532). Aristotle underlined. 
100. Cf. CM 8.1 (1683-1684). 
101. Cf ahovè, p. 296. 
102. Cf. CM 9.5 (1828). Form is in matter. 
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the notion of cause and principle which St. Thomas seems ta be regarding as 
innovative here. Thus, he divides 7.17 into the two points: that the quiddity is cause 
and principle; and what sort of cause and princip le it is (1649). This point was 
mentioned at the beginning of Book 7, but our treatise has been dominated by 
quiddity as definition. 103 From this point of view, the quiddity seems ta stand by itself 
in a sort of intelligible sphere. Its notional separability is exploited to the utmost, and 
rather than appear as cause or principle, it seems more to appear as substance itself, 
with the particular as something more like an attendent shadow than as an effect. 
That the new approach, the causal, is new is illustrated in a way by the mode of 
exemplification now employed. Typical is the house and its construction. 104 We are in 
the domain of events, of generation and corruption. Even though it is the intrinsic 
cause which mainly interests us, it is by the consideration of the assembling and 
disassembling of things that we catch sight of the causal contribution. 105 Generation 
as an approach to ens as ens has been present in the background all along. 106 N ow it is 
coming forward. 
The challenge for the formulator of this doctrine is to put the notion of cause to 
work even within substance. This is a challenge because it would seem that substance 
involves simplicity whereas causality in volves composition. Thus, as regards 
substance, one sees the problem presented in 7.17, that it does not appear to be a 
cause at ail: this is presented by means of the simplicity of the question which 
inquires about the substance, viz "what is it1" (1662-1668). And yet there is already 
the clue, in the way the mere logician speaks about causes generally, i.e. "because of 
what is AB?", thus using the "what" to name what are manifestly causes, namely the 
agent and the end, that the true "what", i.e. the substance, has the nature of a cause 
(cf. 1656-1661). 
That causality involves composition is brought out in CM 7.17 (1649-1655) : that 
causal inquiry is always about a duality: why A is B. 
The picture of the quiddity (still considered as that which corresponds to the 
question: "what is it ?") as cause already brings in the role of matter (1667 -1668). And 
one might weil wonder what more there is to say about the quiddity as cause - a sort 
of "influence" of form on matter. And yet St. Thomas designates the considerable 
passages of 7.17 which remain (i.e. 1672-1680) as treating of what sort of cause or 
principle quiddity is. The problem seems ta be that once one locales the causa lit y of 
the quiddity as intrinsic, one runs the risk of confusing its proper causal contribution 
with that of the matter. Thus Aristotle calls our attention to the mode of unit y which 
is unqualified unit y . And he points out that such a unit is not merely its elements, but 
that inasmuch as one can have the elements and not have the unit, it is seen that there 
103. Cf. CM 7.5 (1378). 
104. Cf. e.g. CM 7.17 (1657, 1658, 1659, 1660, 1666). 
105. Cf. CM 7.17 (1672-1674). 
106. Cf. especially CM 6.2 (1179); and cf. 7.1 (1256); ev en 4.1 (540-543): the realm of rmio is put in 
last place. though this is not quite what is said. For the way we have a hint of this even as the 
ground of definition itself, cf. 7.4 (1339-1340). 
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is "something else" within the unit. This something else cannot be conceived as an 
element, that is, as a cause after the manner of matter. (1675-1677) Rather, it is the 
principle and cause of being (1679). 
We should note, at this point in CM, on the very threshold of Book 8, and with 
the very words of Aristotle, the way St. Thomas insists upon the need to locate this 
sort of substance (i.e. the cause of being), not just anywhere, but in natural things: 
"Therefore, he [Aristotle] says that because some things are not substances, as is 
particularly c1ear in the case of artifacts, but whatever are according to nature, as 
regards being, and constituted by nature, as regards becoming, are true 
substances, il will be manifest that this nature which we have sought is substance 
in some, viz in natural, things, and not in aIl. Which nature, also, is not an 
e/em en t, but the formai principle ... " (1680) 
We come strongly to the viewpoint of nature and generation. 
d) Book 8 
Lastly, in this section, we will consider a few aspects of Book 8. One is the use 
St. Thomas makes of the word "principium". We have already seen that St. Thomas 
regards the move to Book 8 as a move "towards existing natural things" [ad res 
naturales existentes].107 He says that here Aristotle intends to treat of them "through 
their own principles" [per propria principia], which, as we have also seen, is the 
procedure of the philosopher in his scientific or demonstrative phase. 108 Thc word 
"principium" is repeated surprisingly often in St. Thomas' presentation of Aristotle 
here in Book 8. Thus, wc read: 
" ... here the Philosopher begins to treat of sensible substances by inquiry into 
their princip/es. 
"And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines concerning the 
matter and the form, which are the principles of sensible substances. In the 
second, concerning their union with each other. 
"Regarding the first point he does two things. First he shows that mattcr is 
principle of sensible substances. Secondly he shows the same about form." 
(CM 8.1: 1686) 
Then, at the beginning of the next leetio, we read: 
"After the Philosopher has sought out the material principle in sensible 
substances, here he inquires into the formai principle ... 
" ... First, he investigates the differences in sensible things, which demonstrate 
the formai principle ... " (CM 8.2: 1691-1692) 
And, in the next lectio: 
"After the Philosopher has sought out the princip/es of sensible substance, 
showing that the sensible substance is composed out of matter and form, now he 
107. CM 8.1 (1681). 
108. Cf. CM 4.4 (577). 
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intends to determine concerning the material and the formai principles, inquiring 
as to those things which are to be considered about each. 
"And it is divided into two parts. In the first he inquires as to those things which 
are to be considered about the formai principle. In the second, those things which 
are to be considered about the material principle ... 
"And because Plato most especially touched upon the formai principle, therefore 
he determines concerning the formaI principle according ta those things which 
Plato held. Thus, the first part is divided into two parts. 
"In the first he determines concerning the formaI principle by comparison with 
the Ideas. In the second, by comparison with numbers." (CM 8.3: 1703-1704) 
At this point. as St. Thomas begins his explanations, this insistence on the full 
formula is left aside. However, as we begin the next lectio (4), "principium formale" 
and "principium materiale" (especially) come in for extraordinarily heavy use, 
extending right into the commentary (cf. 1729-1732). And, lastly, they are used once 
again in the introduction to the last lectio (CM 8.5: 1755). 
This use of "principium" corresponds, it seems to us, not only to the "new 
beginning" we saw in 7.17, with quiddity now taken as formai principle of being, but 
also to the idea that we are now working with existing natural substance. The hope is 
to avoid the picture of form as a substance in its own right, a picture so much 
encouraged by the definitional approach. St. Thomas is here very much in accord 
with the doctrine he expressed earlier, in the part of Book 7 dealing with quiddity and 
generation: 
"Matter and form ... are not substances, except insofar as they are the principles 
of composite substance." 109 
Thus, also, here in 8.1, in explaining the division of substance into matter, form, and 
composite, and their status as substances, the composite appears to get the primary 
role: 
"But the composite out of these is said to be substance as separable unqualifiedly, 
that is, capable of existing by itse1f separately in reality; and of it alone there is 
generation and corruption." (1687) 
St. Thomas thus paraphrases the Latin Aristotle's "separabile simpliciter" [separable 
unqualifiedly] with the unusually explicit formula: "separatim per se existere potens 
in rerum natura" [capable of existing by itself separately in reality]. And our 
inclination is to see the reference to generation and corruption (which, of course, is in 
Aristotle) as a way of pointing out that this is the thing which is, in the primary sense 
of "iS".110 
We see this aspect of the situation still more evidently when we consider that in 
Book 8 the first step is the presentation of the material principle. It is arrived at 
through the consideration of substantial generation and corruption. As St. Thomas 
says: 
109. CM 7.6 (1386). 
110. Cf. CM 7.1 (1256) and 6.2 (1179); also 4.2 (551-552). 
313 
LA WRENCE DEWAN 
"From this argument of Aristotle it is apparent that substantial generation and 
corruption are the starting-point for coming to the knowledge of prime matter." 
(CM 8.1: 1689) 
Clearly then, it is of substance as caught sight of with the help of generation and 
corruption that we have to do here. 
We saw at the outset that matter is not a cause ofbeings as beings. However, it is 
only inasmuch as we distinguish between matter and form, as a compositionfound in 
existing substances, that we can have the duality required to see the causality of form. 
And in 8.2, we have the presentation of form, by means of the differences found 
among things. Aristotle's approach to the question by using Democritus, and the 
subsequent use of ex amples in artifacts and natural things, puts us very much into the 
more "physical" realm. N evertheless, the definitional approach is mixed in as weil. III 
Thus, we find St. Thomas paraphrasing Aristotle as follows: 
"He shows how the aforementioned differences are reIated to substances; and he 
says : from the foregoing it is now clear that in the aforementioned differences is to 
be sought that which is the formaI cause of being [causaformalis essendr] of any of 
the aforesaid, of which they are the differences, ifthings are such that the formaI 
substance [substantia formalis] or 'what it is' is the cause of any being [causa 
cuiuslibet essendl], as was shown in Book 7. For the aforesaid differences signify 
the form and the 'what it is' of the aforementioned things. However, none of the 
aforesaid differences is substance, nor anything near to substance (as pertaining to 
the genus of substance). But the same proportion is found in them as is found in 
substance. [1697] For Just as in the genus of substance, the difference, which is 
predicated of the genus, and cornes to it for the constituting of the species, is 
compared to it as act and form, so a/so in the other definitions." 112 
Here, St. Thomas is impelled to add: 
"But III one ought not to understand that the difference is the form, or that the 
genus is the matter, since the genus and the differences are predicated of the 
species, but the matter and the form are not predicated of the composite; but 
this is said because the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, 
while the difference is taken from that which is formaI. For example, the genus 
of man is 'animal', because it signifies 'something having a sentie nt nature'; 
which [sentient nature] indeed stands materially towards the intellective nature, 
from which is taken 'rational', which is the difference of man; but 'rational' 
signifies 'something having an intellective nature'. And thus it is that the genus 
has the differences potentially, and that the genus and the difference are 
proportionate to the matter and the form, as Porphyry says. And for that reason 
also it is said here that the act, that is, the difference, is predicated of the matter, 
i.e. the genus; and similarly in the other genera". (1697) 
St.Thomas, as he indicates by the paraphrase quoted first, would have liked Aristotle 
to say that "the difference, which is predicated of the genus, ... is compared to it as act 
and form ... " But what he finds in the text is that "that which is predicated of the 
11 J. Cf. ARISTOTLE al 8.2 (1042b25-43a26) and St. Thomas, CM 8.2 (1694-1701). 
112. CM 8.2 (1696-1697). Aristotle underlined (approximately). 
113. The text here has "enim", but we are reading "autem". 
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matter is aCI". I.e. Aristotle said that the act is predicated of the matter. He is, in 
St.Thomas' eyes, mixing a way ofspeaking which pertains to the logical, definitional, 
or predicational approach, with the considerations (matter, and act or form) proper 
to the philosophical approach. St. Thomas puts first in his paraphrase what he would 
like to have found, then explains the situation to the reader, and lastly introduces the 
actual text. He painstakingly distinguishes the factors pertaining to the two domains. 
St. Thomas is determined not to confuse what pertains to logical consideration 
with the knowledge of the proper principles of the existing natural thing. In insisting 
that he is speaking about the principles, St. Thomas never allows them to be 
envisaged as mere duplicates of the subsisting thing. 
Besides the scrupulous use of "principium", another important point in Book 8 Îs 
the key role of the notion of matter for the conception of form as cause of beÎng. 
Besides the already-mentioned fact that we begin the discussion with matter, this 
point can perhaps be heightened by a brief consideration of CM 8.3 (1713). There the 
Platonists are complimented for having said that the hou se is not stone and 
composition, as though the house were constituted out of these as out of parts of 
matter. If this were so, i.e. if the form were one of the parts of matter, it would depend 
on matter. And we see that this is false, says St. Thomas, because the composition 
and the mixture, which are the formaI princip les [formalia principia], are not 
constituted out of the things which are composed or are mixed, just as neither is 
anything else formaI constituted out of its matter, but rather the converse. Being-a-
threshold is constituted by position, which is its form, and not vice versa. 
The point that the form is the cause of being is seen to the extent that the 
ontological indetermination of matter is seen. It must be grasped as the character of 
the effect as an effect, so that the form will be the cause of being. And it is the 
development of the notion of matter in the light of generation and corruption which 
brings about the vision of the required dependent nature. Thus it is se en that form is 
truly the cause, within the ens, of nothing short of its being ens. 114 lt is not at ail 
necessary to have a form capable of separa te existence, in order to see that the form is 
the cause of being. It is only necessary to grasp the ontological character of matter, 
and to see form, then, as something quite distinct. Even a form whose being is so 
inseparable from matter that it cannot be conceived without matter 115 nevertheless 
appears as cause of being of the whole composite. 
Lastly, concerning the final/eclio of Book 8, in which the union of the material 
and formaI princip les is presented, we should note to what extent we have once again 
the problems of definition, as presented in Book 7, mixed in with the presentation. Of 
course, the same mixture was found in Book 7 itself: e.g. in CM 7.11, we had the 
same sort of presentation of the solution in natural things (1516-1519), then in 
mathematicals (1520-1522), as we have here in 8.5: i.e. natural things in 1759, 
mathematicals in 1760, and separate entity in 1762. 
114. Cf., on the relation of form, taken as form. to matter, St. THOMAS, De subslanliis separalis, c. 7 
(ed. Leonine, lines 91-102). 
115. Cf. CM 7.9 (1477). 
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But this very mixture in the Aristotelian text suggests the extent to which 
St. Thomas' insistence on the move from logical to existential consideration as the 
movement of the Metaphysics, is an interpretation, and probably involves a certain 
ingredient of what "ought to be found in Aristotle", in St. Thomas' judgment. 
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